Overview of Country Experience in Land Rights and Developmental Statehood: South Korea, Taiwan, China and Singapore by Stebek, EN
 207   
 
Overview of Country Experience in Land 
Rights and Developmental Statehood:  
South Korea, Taiwan, China and Singapore  
 
 
Elias N. Stebek ♣ 
Abstract 
This article examines lessons that can be drawn from the land rights regimes of 
four countries that have commendable economic performance. It highlights the 
nature of land rights during the developmental statehood pursuits of three East 
Asian states (South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) and a country that currently 
pursues socialist market economic policy, i.e. China. The themes that are 
considered include (a) lessons from the land rights regime in South Korea 
including the salient features of developmental states, (b) Taiwan’s land reform 
during the early 1950s and land requisition for industrial use, (c) China’s land 
rights regime and administrative laws, and (d) land rights in Singapore and 
entrepreneur perceptions about its institutions. These countries are chosen due 
to their relevance to the Ethiopian land law regime. The article highlights how 
South Korea and Taiwan carried out effective land reform by redistributing 
private land rights without resorting to nationalization. It is argued that neither 
the notion of state ownership of land as practised in Singapore nor current 
improvements in the scope of Chinese land use rights explain the denial of 
economic value to land use rights.   
Key words 
Land use rights, developmental state, land reform, property rights. 
DOI       http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/mlr.v7i2.2 
_____________ 
Introduction 
Since 1975, Ethiopia’s land laws have pursued an ideological path that was 
significantly influenced by the Soviet Union and China. Land is still publicly 
owned in Ethiopia despite the post-1991 shift toward the privatization of various 
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publicly owned enterprises and the policy declaration of market-based economic 
policy. The Ethiopian government currently pledges to pursue the economic 
policies of a democratic developmental state.   
Country experience from selected countries can thus be relevant. The 
experiences of South Korea and Taiwan are relevant because the path they have 
undergone as developmental states until the 1970s and 1980s can inform the 
pursuits of countries who are in the course of espousing the path. The current 
land reform pursuits in China are relevant because they indicate the changes that 
are being made in a country that has not yet disclaimed (the Marxist version of) 
socialism, but still considers its economic system as socialist, with Chinese 
characteristics. Even if Singapore is a city state which is drastically different 
from countries like Ethiopia, the economic value given to land use rights in the 
context of public ownership of land renders its experience relevant to Ethiopia. 
1.  Features of Developmental States: The South Korean 
Experience 
1.1 Salient features of developmental states 
The policy setting of developmental statehood in South Korea (highlighted in 
this section) informs the discussion on land rights (in Section 2) that prevailed 
during the 1960s and 1970s. These decades mark the initial years of economic 
take-off for South Korea, after which the country’s legal regime progressively 
marched onto a path of lesser state involvement. A brief discussion of the 
features of developmental states (with South Korea as an example)1 is meant to 
offer an overview of the policy framework in which land rights were formulated 
in South Korea during its land reform of the 1960s and thereafter.   
The overall property rights index of developmental states shows that they 
rank higher than other Asian States. Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan rank as the highest in comparison to all countries in Asia.2  The 
scores are 90 each for Hong Kong and Singapore, 80 for Japan and 70 each for 
South Korea and Taiwan. A developmental state goes extra miles (beyond day 
to day state functions) and involves itself in pursuits of creating conducive 
conditions for the development and economic performance of the private sector. 
What characterizes a developmental state does not relate to restrictions it 
imposes on private property rights, but its level of state intervention in 
                                           
1 The scope of this article does not allow an elaborate discussion on the path undergone 
by all East Asian developmental states during their economic take-offs. 
2 <http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Asia/South-Korea/property-rights-index>, 
accessed: 03 August 2013. 
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empowering and supporting economic actors while at the same time retaining its 
autonomy from rent-seeking individuals and companies among economic actors.  
The mainstream argument in favour of the non-interventionist minimal state 
and the need for wider space for market mechanisms is the following: 
As states expand their size, their range of functions, and the amount of 
resources they control, the proportion of economic activity that becomes 
incorporated into rental havens will increase correspondingly, and economic 
efficiency and dynamism will decline. Conversely, to the degree that the 
economic power and prerogatives of the state can be curtailed, prospects for 
growth, efficiency, and welfare will be enhanced. Therefore, the sphere of 
state action should be reduced to the minimum, and bureaucratic control 
should be replaced by market mechanisms wherever possible.3  
This, however, assumes the existence of the conditions for the effective 
operation of what Adam Smith regarded as the ‘invisible hand’4 of market 
mechanisms that operate in the interest of the common good while everyone 
pursues his/her self-interest. The caveat in this regard is the need to consider the 
two assumptions of being informed and being rational that are inherent in Adam 
Smith’s notion of utmost freedom of exchange based on self-interest. Smith 
envisaged “rational choice” that presupposes informed self-interest and rational 
decisions that give due respect to the legitimate interest of others.  
… [A]ccording to Smith, men do not always act in their own interest. They 
can be mistaken about what it is (as when they are not as thrifty as they 
should be). When they know their interest they can be mistaken about what 
will best serve it (as when they overestimate the chance of success in an 
occupation). Or they may not consult their interest at all (as when the pursuit 
of pleasure drives them to ruin).5 
Free market envisages exchange of goods/services which presumes the 
capability, opportunity and access for individuals, legal persons and economic 
systems to produce the goods and the services to be marketed. In other words, 
the one on the buying end should also be able to produce and sell goods and/or 
                                           
3
  Peter B. Evans (1989), “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A 
Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State”, Sociological 
Forum, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 564. 
4 “In the Wealth of Nations, Smith writes of an invisible hand in the course of describing 
a particular condition that may or may not be present in a transaction on a competitive 
market. The condition is that in which a man who intends to benefit only himself in a 
particular way may, in the act of procuring that benefit, produce a benefit of a 
different kind for everyone including himself.” William D. Grampp (2000), “What 
Did Smith Mean by the Invisible Hand?” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 
3 (The University of Chicago Press, June 2000), p. 443. 
5 Id., p. 444 [citing (Wealth of Nations, pp. 346, 123, 907)] 
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services commensurate with what he/she/it buys. This seems to assume a setting 
whereby economic actors operate in a subjective state of competence and 
responsibility plus the social and global trading environment which does not 
offer free ride to certain hegemonic economic actors.  
Although the notion of the developmental state is relatively recent, there 
have been states that pursued policies beyond the minimal state functions of 
maintaining peace, security and national defence. There was state intervention to 
facilitate the take-off phases of economic systems, and this includes countries 
such as Germany and USA during their kick-start phases of industrialization. 
This was advocated by Freidrich List (1789-1846), who, inter alia, addressed 
the issue of delayed (catch-up) development due to which ‘a less productive 
economy’ is ‘confronted by a more productive one’.6  List supported state 
involvement in protecting infant industries because products from countries with 
low levels of competitiveness will lose in the competition.7 The extent to which 
the role of the state has diminished under the current realities of globalization 
has been subject to academic discourse.8   
The notion of the developmental state is capitalist but still different from 
laissez-faire capitalism; It is also different from market socialism (such as the 
Chinese model of development) and soviet type command economies.9 Yu-Shan 
Yu notes the features of property rights in laissez faire capitalism (private 
ownership and private control), state capitalism (private ownership and state 
control) and command economy (state ownership and state control),10 and 
analyzes the Chinese economic reforms in comparison with these three 
economic systems. Chinese economic reforms did not (unlike capitalist 
developmental states such as Japan, Taiwan and the others) embrace private 
ownership as the mainstream property rights regime, and did not also cling onto 
the traditional soviet-model command economy.  It rather allowed cohabitation 
of the private sector with the dominant public sector, and in particular, allowed 
market economy (blended with some regulation) to be at the wheels 
                                           
6 Dieter Senghaas (1991), ‘Freidrich List and the Basic Problems of Modern 
Development’, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer, 1991), pp. 
451-452. 
7 Ibid. 
8 For an elaborate discussion against the assertions concerning ‘the diminishing role of 
the state’, see for example, David Levi-Faur (1997), ‘Friedrich List and the Political 
Economy of the Nation State’, Review of International Political Economy, 4:1. Spring 
1997, 154-178.  
9 See for example, Yu-Shan Wu (1994), Comparative Economic Transformations, 
Mainland China, Hungary, the Soviet Union and Taiwan (Stanford University Press,). 
10 Ibid, p. viii. 
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accompanied by managerial autonomy of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 
particularly where they face demand unpredictability and market competition.11  
With regard to the core features of developmental states, Chalmers Johnson 
argues that “the post-war Japanese economic ‘miracle’ should go primarily to 
conscious and consistent government policies dating from at least the 1920s”12 
and he explains the economic, political and social settings in which the Japanese 
model of development emerged and progressed. Yet he contests 
overgeneralizations of economic achievements out of context and underlines 
that “any social science … must deal with both the gereralizable and the 
particular, without ruling one or the other out of the court”.13 Johnson notes that 
the developmental state is “determined to influence the direction and pace of 
economic development by directly intervening in the development process, 
rather than relying on the uncoordinated influence of market forces to allocate 
economic resources”.14  In the course of the state’s intervention in the 
development process, he notes the balance of power that exists between the state 
and economic actors: 
When the developmental state is working well, neither the state officials nor 
the civilian enterprise managers prevail over the other. The state is a 
‘catalyst’ agency, in Michael Lands sense of the term, and the managers are 
responding to the incentives and disincentives that the state establishes.15  
This is not an easy combination to put together, but when it is done properly, 
it can produce miracles of economic development.16 
The capitalist developmental state is interventionist because it assumes wider 
roles and actively involves itself in creating an enabling environment for 
economic actors. On the other hand, the developmental state does not control the 
economy through central planning and state ownership of the means of 
production because it does not substitute nor dominate economic actors who are 
at the wheels of ownership of the means of production.   
                                           
11 For the factors that can potentially determine the degree of managerial autonomy of 
State Owned Enterprises in China, see, for example, S. Loukas et al (1993), 
‘Managerial Autonomy of State-Owned Enterprises: Determining Factors’, 
Organization Science 4(4), November 1993, pp. 645 – 666. 
12 Chalmers Johnson (1999), ‘The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept’, in The 
Developmental State, edited by Meredith Woo-Cummings (Cornell University Press), 
p. 34. 
13 Id., p. 43. 
14  See Johnson, Chalmers (1982), MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of 
Industry Policy 1925- 1975, (Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
15 Michael Land. ‘The Catalyst State’, National Interest, Spring 1992, pp. 5-12 [in 
Johnson supra note 12, p. 60). 
16 Johnson supra note 12, p. 60. 
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Instead, developmental states assume a significant role in the economic life 
of the society through policies, strategic planning and decisions in contrast to 
the non-interventionist thin (police) state that allows very wide roles to local, 
regional and global market forces. Invariably, developmental states pursue the 
capitalist mode of production, but strive to have political, financial, structural 
and administrative policy space and influence in the process.  The tasks of 
developmental states go beyond regulatory functions and include activities that 
are necessary for economic transformation.17  
States, according to Evans, may be developmental or predatory depending 
upon “the way in which they affect development”.18 Developmental states 
“foster long-term entrepreneurial perspectives among private elites by 
increasing incentives to engage in transformative investments and lowering the 
risks involved in such investments”, and as a result they promote transformation 
and development.19 As Amsden notes, “the two major features of a 
developmental state are the capacity “to discipline big business, and thereby to 
dispense subsidies to big business according to a more effective set of allocative 
principles”.20   
Evans makes a distinction between developmental states and ‘predatory’ 
states and he states that in the latter case, “[t]hose who control the state 
apparatus seem to plunder without any more regard for the welfare of the 
citizenry than a predator has for the welfare of its prey.”  According to Evans, 
the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) are examples of a 
developmental state, while countries such as Zaire [of the late 1980s] illustrate 
what he considers as the “predatory state” and Brazil [of the late 1980s] as the 
‘intermediary’ case.21 
Vartiainen, [identifies] three salient features of a successful developmental 
state. … . Primarily, the developmental state must be strong to impose its 
collective developmental objectives, be meritocratic and ought to be 
“insulated from both the market and the logic of individual utility 
maximization”.  Secondly, the state should have “thick external ties 
[embeddedness] to the economy’s organized agents such as corporations, 
industrialists, associations and trade unions.” And thirdly, there must be “a 
relationship of mutual dependence or mutual balance between the state and 
                                           
17 Elias N. Stebek, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 6. No. 2 [Citing Peter B. Evans (1989), 
‘Predatory, Developmental and other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy 
Perspective on the Third World State,” Sociological Forum, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 562. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Id., pp. 562, 563. 
20 A. H. Amsden (1989),  Asia’s Next Grant,: South Korea and Late Industrialization, 
New York: Oxford University Press, p. 144. 
21 Evans p. 563, in Stebek, supra note 17. 
 
 
Overview of Country Experience in Land Rights and Developmental Statehood               213 
 
the rest of the economy” in such a manner that the state can be “able to 
‘discipline’ economic actors such as firms and trade unions, while 
appreciating that their privileged positions ultimately depend on the success 
of the economy”.22   
The core salient features of the developmental state can thus be summarized as: 
first, active involvement in creating enabling conditions to economic actors by 
enhancing opportunities and lowering risks, second, institutional capabilities 
based on meritocracy (which relates to both competence and integrity) and 
thirdly, embedded autonomy which requires close collaboration and disciplining 
initiatives in its relationship with ‘the economy’s organized agents’ by at the 
same time retaining its autonomy from the opportunistic benefits that the 
relationship may, at times, create.  
The purpose and features of interventions by developmental and predatory 
states are thus drastically different. While a developmental state “empowers and 
monitors economic actors” and uses strong “meritocratic institutions that 
monitor economic actors towards the country’s developmental strategic 
objectives”, predatory states “are not only corrupt but also make use of coercive 
institutions that scare economic actors and intimidate entrepreneurs in the guise 
of regulatory intervention”.23  
There are criticisms regarding the various aspects of authoritarianism in 
developmental states as observed in Asian countries. The current discourse on 
developmental states, in effect, uses the qualifier ‘democratic’. This concept is 
in the course of being expressed as a policy orientation in various African 
countries including Ethiopia, a task which involves various commitments, 
challenges and opportunities. 
The Economic Commission for Africa (in its 2011 Report) defines the 
developmental state as:  
“one that has the capacity to deploy its authority, credibility and legitimacy 
in a binding manner to design and implement development policies and 
programmes for promoting transformation and growth, as well as for 
expanding human capabilities. Such a state takes as its overall socio-
economic goals the long-term growth and structural transformation of the 
economy, with equity”.24  
                                           
22 Stebek, supra note 17, p. 328; Citing Juhana Vartiainen, “The Economics of 
Successful State Intervention in Industrial Transformation” in The Developmental 
State (1999), Edited by Meredith Woo-Cumings (Cornell University Press) pp. 218-
219. 
23 Id., pp. 328-329. 
24  Economic Commission for Africa (2011),  Economic Report on Africa 2011: 
Governing development in Africa – the role of the state in economic transformation, 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia., p. 7. 
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The Report notes that “[i]ssues of market failure abound, requiring the state’s 
positive intervention”.25 It states that “free market forces will not drive 
economic transformation on their own” and underlines the central role of the 
state “in resource allocation and in efficient coordination of crucial economic 
activities” with particular attention to “developing infrastructure, human capital, 
and the financial market and setting up production facilities in the agricultural 
and industrial sectors”.26  
According to the Report this needs “a democratic socio-political environment 
that endows it with legitimacy and authority” and to provide “stakeholders with 
the voice and representation that enable them to have a sense of ownership of 
the country’s national development programme”.27 
  The capacity of the developmental state for formulating and implementing 
such a programme has two component parts. The first consists of a political 
leadership that is committed to national development goals and that can 
motivate and guide the planning process. The second is a competent and 
professional bureaucracy that has the autonomy and power to implement the 
programme and respond swiftly to rapidly changing local and global 
conditions.  Its personnel must be recruited solely on merit, well trained and 
adequately rewarded.28 
1.2  Lessons from South Korea’s economic performance 
Pirie observes that the Korean developmental state “must be understood as a 
child of its time”.29 Korea’s industrialization took place in the midst of 
“Japanese dominated regional production structures” and the involvement of 
“the US in shaping Korean political economy” in the context of the post-war 
global development project and the second industrial revolution”.30  Pirie notes 
South Korea’s “initial underdevelopment and the security situation on the 
peninsula” which brought about “the project of state-led capitalist 
development”.31 While both the South Korean state and post-war core capitalist 
national industrial states focused very closely on promoting and subsidizing 
investments of large nationally owned firms, South Korea “was a dirigiste state 
in a world of interventionist states” and “Korean elites were attempting to 
                                           
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Id., p. 8. 
28 Ibid. 
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develop a distinctive Korean capitalism in a world of interconnected but still 
distinct national capitalisms”.32  
The lessons that are examined regarding South Korea’s achievements relate 
to the policies of its developmental state during the 1960s and 1970s. “In 1960, 
South Korea was poorer than many sub-Saharan African countries. ... Since then 
[it has] left far behind not only these African countries, but also others like 
Mexico and Argentina which had been much richer”.33 
  In 1960 South Korea was one of the poorest 25 countries in the world [FN 
1].  Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was just $82 (in 1960 
prices). United States (US) policymakers’ assessment of the country as a 
‘hopeless case’ appeared apposite at the time.34 However, the performance 
of the Korean economy over the next four decades or so could not have been 
more different from that predicted by such policymakers in 1960. ... Korea 
was now a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and one of the few countries that appeared to have 
successfully graduated from the Third World.35 
In 1961, i.e. the initial year of Korea’s developmental state, GDP per capita of 
various African countries was higher than South Korea’s US$92. For example, 
African countries that had higher GDP per capita (in US dollars) as compared to 
South Korea include: Algeria ($221), Benin ($96), Cameroon ($119), Chad 
($111), Congo Democratic  Republic ($199), Congo Rep ($146), Ivory Coast 
($164), Egypt ($151), Gabon ($343), Ghana ($187), Kenya ($95) Liberia 
($161), Madagascar ($134), Morocco ($169), Niger ($145), Nigeria ($95), 
Senegal ($262), Sychelles ($270), Sierra Leone ($148), South Africa ($430), 
Sudan ($103), Tunisia ($202), Zambia ($218), Zimbabwe ($283).36 There has 
been extensive discourse on the factors that have brought about this 
development.  
South Korea’s GDP per capita for the year 2012 is $22,590 (GNI in power 
purchase parity is $28,23137). The GDP of African countries in 2012 that had 
                                           
32 Ibid. 
33 Dani Rodrik (1995),  “Getting Interventions Right: How Korea and Taiwan grew 
Rich”, Economic Policy, Vol. 10, No. 20 (Apr., 1995), p. 55 
34 Hart-Landsberg, M. (1993), The Rush to Development: Economic Change and 
Political Struggle in South Korea, New York, Monthly Review Press [in Pirie, infra 
note 26, p. 1] 
35 Iain Pirie (2008), The Korean Developmental State: From dirigisme to neo-liberalism, 
(Routledge), p. 1. 
36 Source of data: World Bank 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_past_and_future_GDP_(nominal) 
per_capita>, last visited: 10 July 2013.   
37 <hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/KOR_print.html> last visited: 25 July 2013. 
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higher GDP per capita figures (in 1961) as compared to South Korea is as 
Follows.38  
Algeria $5,404 Cote d’Ivoire $1,244 Ghana $1,605 Niger $383 S. Africa $7,508 
Benin $752 Egypt $3,187 Kenya $862 Nigeria $1,555 Sudan $1,580 
Cameroon $1,151 Ethiopia $470 Liberia $422 Senegal $1,032 Tunisia $4,237 
Congo Dem.  Rep $272 Gabon  $11,430 Madagascar $447 Sychelles $11,758 Zambia $1,469 
Congo Rep $3,154 Gambia $512 Morocco $2,925 Sierra Leone $635 Zimbabwe $788 
 
South Korea’s Country HDI Profile (2012): Human Development Indicators39 
show that its performance in health, education, income, sustainability, 
innovation and technology, trade and economy, and other HDI indicators was 
indeed commendable. South Korea’s Human Development Index (1980 to 2012) 
shows steadily increasing achievements.40  
Rodrik recalls the “extremely well-educated labour force relative to their 
physical capital stock” which rendered “the latent return to capital quite high” 
and the active support of the state in “subsidizing and coordinating investment 
decisions” and the role of government policies that were “managed to engineer a 
significant increase in the private return to capital”. 41 The other factors noted by 
Rodrik include an “exceptional degree of equality in income and wealth”, 
effective government intervention and “keeping it free of rent seeking. The 
outward orientation of the economy was the result of the increase in demand for 
imported capital goods”.42 Rodrik further notes that in the early 1960s and 
thereafter, Korea and Taiwan alleviated the coordination failure in their 
economies which had blocked take-off and this “required a range of strategic 
interventions - including investment subsidies, administrative guidance and the 
use of public enterprise”.43 He further notes the favourable human capital 
endowment and relatively equal distribution of income and wealth.44 
The support provided by the government went beyond export subsidization 
and further included increase in subsidy on export credits, exemption of 
exporters from the commodity tax and the business activity tax, and reduction of 
income tax on export earnings.45 The support offered to promote exports also 
included “direct cash grants on exports” until 1965.46 Moreover, exporters “were 
allowed automatic access to duty-free imports of raw materials and intermediate 
                                           
38 Compiled from: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD> Last 
visited: 25 July 2013. 
39 <hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/KOR_print.html>, last visited: 23 July 2013. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Rodrik, supra note 33. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Id., p. 57 
44 Ibid. 
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inputs up to a limit” which “was determined administratively, on the basis of 
firms' and industries' input-output coefficients plus a margin of 'wastage 
allowance'.”47 
Bagchi48 observes various factors that contributed to Korea’s economic 
success during the 1960s and 1970s. He recalls Korea’s colonial experience 
under Japan since 1910, US influence until the late 1950s and the land reform 
that triumphed over landlordism. He observes that the Korean government 
obtained a large stock of industrial assets from the confiscation of Japanese 
property “and a substantial percentage of the cultivable land which could then 
be distributed to the Koreans” followed by significant land reform measures. 49 
“As a result of the land reform process, between 1947 and 1965, the percentage 
of full owners among farm households increased from 16.5 to 69.5, whereas that 
of pure tenants declined from 42.1 to 7.0 only”. This land reform which was 
pro-peasant relatively equalized rural incomes and assets thereby eliminating 
land “as an asset for speculation or as a lever for keeping actual producers 
dependent”.50 Bagchi regards this as one of the conducive conditions and further 
identifies “a strong and realistic sense of nationalism” as another significant 
factor in Korea’s economic success.51  
The other conditions identified by Bagchi that assisted the pursuits of the 
developmental state in Korea are the gains in import substitution efforts during 
the 1950s, commendable achievements in education, “privileged access South 
Korea enjoyed to U.S. capital and U.S. markets, especially in the 1960s and 
1970s, export-led growth that had a strong foundation from the achievements 
obtained in the earlier decade and institutional capabilities that steadily 
developed since the 1950s.52 Bagchi notes the sustained improvements in 
productivity through rising levels of education of the workforce, learning by 
doing and learning by using, and exploitation of economies of scale through the 
favoured treatment of large firms especially in exports”.53  
In the course of achievements in Research and Development initiatives by 
government and industries, “a deliberate restructuring of industry” was made 
which focused on sectors such as “shipbuilding, electronics, automobiles, iron 
and steel, and petrochemicals”.54 The success in “domestic investment and 
                                           
47 Ibid, [citing Charles R. Frank et al (1975), Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic 
Development: South Korea, (New York: Colombia University Press)]  
48 Amiya Kumar Bagchi (2004), The Developmental State in History and in the 
Twentieth Century (New Delhi: Regency Publications). 
49 Id., p. 41. 
50 Id., p. 42. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Id., p. 44. 
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saving, the growth of national income, and exports of manufactures” were 
enhanced and, “the close collaboration between government and business, and 
the effective monitoring by government of strategic business decisions played a 
highly important role”.55 As the manufacturing sector of South Korea 
developed, large surpluses were generated in its exports, and “the Korean 
government played a less interventionist role in the economy; and many of the 
formal restrictions on entry of foreign goods and foreign capital were relaxed, 
partly under the pressure of the US government and foreign transnational 
corporations”.56 
1.3  Lessons from South Korea about the limits of developmental 
states 
As Korea’s experience indicates, there is a phase of obsolescence of the 
developmental state during which its role in enhancing economic development 
outlives its usefulness because wider state intervention in the economy 
eventually becomes undue patronage and red tape, as marked by the massive 
labour unrest of the 1980s and Korea’s 1997 economic crisis. One of the lessons 
that can be learnt from Korea’s experience is that the developmental state 
nurtures and facilitates the coalescence of an economic system to which it at a 
later stage becomes an impediment.   
                                           
55 Ibid. 
56 Id., pp. 45-46. “In the 1990s, the South Korean DS [developmental state] entered into 
a phase of precocious maturity and decline. Several factors contributed to this. The 
deliberate promotion of chaebol by the South Korean government up to 1982-83 - and 
in many cases, even beyond that date - created a number of South Korean 
transnational corporations which set up branches and subsidiaries in many countries 
of the world, including the U.S.A., Canada and major European countries. 
        The latter now demanded freer entry for the investments and products of their 
firms into South Korea. Until 1993 or thereabouts, South Korea, following the 
Japanese example had kept inward foreign investment at bay. After that year, 
restrictions on foreign portfolio and direct investment were relaxed and a much 
greater mobility of capital was permitted in international transactions. This led to an 
inflow of foreign capital. Moreover, the Japanese yen and the Chinese yuan were 
substantially devalued from around the same date. These developments led to an 
overvaluation of the Korean currency, and South Korea ran up large deficits in its 
balance of payments. South Korean firms borrowed large amounts abroad to take 
advantage of lower interest rates abroad. By the beginning of 1997, South Korea was 
caught in a debt trap, and in the last quarter of that year, it had to seek IMF assistance 
in order to avoid declaration of debt default (Bagchi, 1998). The usual IMF 
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The concurring motives of both major actors in the process (i.e. the 
developmental state and the large capitalist firms) are different. Unlike the 
conventional modern minimal state which is usually part of the capitalist 
economic system, the developmental state does not promote its own class 
interests, but rather targets at the bigger picture of economic development of the 
nation at large. This creates tension in the developmental state’s raison d’être of 
developing private capital which is manifested in its economic strategy “of 
developing and supporting large national capitalist firms” and its act of 
dominating and controlling these firms”.  The developmental state in South 
Korea did not act at the behest of the capitalist class – which it itself created – 
but it was committed to acting in its interests”.57 
Despite such tension in the concurrent motives of the state and the major 
economic actors, the ultimate outcome of teaming up brought about 
commendable achievements throughout the 1960s and this setting enabled quick 
recovery from the crisis of the early 1970s. However, Korea’s experience 
indicates the eventual limits in the pursuits of developmental states. These limits 
are influenced by the contradictions that are inherent in developmental states.  
The first contradiction relates to the role of the state as the “provider of long-
term goals for the economy” and the eventual decline of its positive role in the 
economy. The developmental state establishes “comprehensive economic 
development plans, long-term goals, and projections for the entire economy”, 
furnishes “capital for investment through domestic and foreign capital loans, 
capital assistance for research and development, and technology and technical 
assistance through national and regional research facilities” and further “acts as 
a mediator with multinational corporations for foreign direct investment and 
technology transfers, establishes trade offices for expertise on exports and 
imports, provides tax breaks and tariff exemptions, and eases regulations”.58 
These services are offered to the private sector because the latter initially “lacks 
resources and knowledge”. In the long run, however, the state becomes a 
hindrance to the “modern economy’s vitality and speed by becoming 
bureaucratic ‘red tape’” when the pursuits of the developmental state become 
successful.59  
Unlike other forms of states, the function of the developmental state is 
transitional and the successful attainment of its goals causes a steady decline in 
                                           
57 Pirie, supra note 35, p.6. [citing Cumings, B. (1979). ‘The origins and development 
of the Northeast Asian political economy: industrial sectors, product cycles, and 
political consequences’, International Organization, 38(1): 1–40] 
58 Eun Mee Kim (1993), “Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental State: With 
Illustrations from the South Korean Case” Social Problems, Vol. 40, No. 2 (May, 
1993) p. 231-232 [citing various sources]. 
59 Id., p. 232. 
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its importance. For example, “[t]he welfare state attempts to remedy the 
problems left unresolved by the private sector” and the successful provision of 
“welfare services to the public does not change the fundamental assumption that 
the private sector is incapable of and/or unwilling to provide these services, and 
that the state must provide them”.60 Likewise, the laissez faire state “assumes 
from the beginning a relatively confined (regulatory rather than developmental) 
and augmentative role in relation to the private sector. Even with successful 
economic growth, no significant transition of power to the market is needed, 
since the private sector is in charge from the beginning”.61 
The second contradiction that emerges upon the success of developmental 
states is the steady blurring of its autonomy in the course of economic 
development. The autonomy of the developmental state emanates from the fact 
that it does not emerge as a representative for “the landed or capitalist classes, 
[and this] insulates state officials from the influence of their own class 
interests”. As the developmental state succeeds, its autonomy is gradually 
eroded because “[d]evelopment brings wealth and power to new classes and 
social groups (Koo 199062; Suh 198463), who use their newly acquired status to 
press for more independence” and this “threatens the core of the developmental 
state, which is its autonomy and its mandate to intervene in the economy”.64   
Kim states that “South Korea's military junta government in 1961-63 were 
not part of the small, wealthy capitalist class, but instead had rather modest 
backgrounds. President Park Chung Hee himself was from an impoverished 
peasant family”.65  
However, the separation of state elites from landed or capitalist classes is 
only a short-lived phase in the process of capitalist development. Successful 
and very rapid development brought drastic changes not only to the 
economy, but to the society as well. The historical class distinction between 
state officials and merchants and industrialists was no longer clearly 
applicable (Koo 1990), and the upper class in a new social order included 
merchants and industrialists as well as state officials (Suh 1984). Moreover, 
through intermarriages between the offspring of capitalists and state elites 
(forbidden during the Yi Dynasty), the class distinction has become even 
                                           
60 Ibid, [citing Evans 1987] 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid, [citing Hagen Koo (1990) "From farm to factory: Proletarianization in Korea." 
American Sociological Review 55:669-81] 
63 Ibid, [citing Gwan-mo Suh (1984) Class Composition and Class Division in 
Contemporary Korean Society. Seoul: Hanul] 
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more blurred (Shin and Chin 1989)66. The process of fusion of state elites 
and capitalist elites weakened the fabric of state autonomy. 67 
The steady erosion in the autonomy of the developmental state is further 
enhanced by the tension between ‘the self-limiting’ features of the 
developmental state which remains an autonomous political and administrative 
entity while the core social groups, i.e. labour and the “capitalist class [grow] in 
size and in political influence with development” and these “newly strengthened 
classes and groups can significantly challenge the state's power and its mandate 
in economic relations”. 68 
2.   Lessons from Land Reforms in South Korea and 
Taiwan 
2.1 Land reform in South Korea 
In the realm of secure property rights South Korea, along with Taiwan, stand 4th 
out of 32 Asian countries ranking after Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan. 69  
Korea was largely agrarian under a feudal system until World War II and “the 
country was split into North and South, with both countries enacting major land 
reform and outlawing tenancy on agricultural lands. While the economy in the 
communist North has stagnated, South Korea has developed a modern, market 
economy”. 70   
South Korea’s 1948 Constitution embodied agricultural land reform and it 
marked a departure from its feudal landholding system. South Korea’s 
Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act (ALRAA) was in force since March 
1950. The act enabled individuals to own agricultural land under three 
conditions:  “first, any individual can own agricultural land but only if he or she 
cultivates or manages it for himself or herself; second, one can own 
                                           
66 Ibid [citing Eui Hang Shin, and Seung  Kwon Chin (1989) "Social affinity among top 
managerial executives of large corporations in Korea." Sociological Forum 4:3-26]. 
67 Id., pp, 232-233. 
68 Id., p. 233. 
69 ‹http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Asia/South-Korea/property-rights-index›, Last 
visited: 22 October 2013. 
70 Justin Maloney (2000), Land Tenure History and Issues in the Republic of Korea 
(University of Maine, Department of Spatial Information Science and Engineering) 
May 2000, p. 7. 
‹http://www.spatial.maine.edu/~onsrud/Landtenure/CountryReport/Korea.pdf›, last 
visited: 30 October 2013. 
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[approximately] three [hectares] at maximum; and third, tenancy arrangements 
and land-renting activities are legally prohibited.”71  
  Extremely low land prices during this period had helped make the ALRAA 
possible. With the breakdown of order in society following World War II, 
landlords saw the rents they were able to extract from tenants drop sharply, 
if they could collect them at all. Many were forced into selling their lands at 
low prices, and approximately 37% of the arable land was sold between 
1945 and 1949. This huge supply of available land negated the effects of 
millions of returning refugees and made a major redistribution possible. As a 
result the ALRAA was very successful, resulting in the near-complete 
elimination of tenant farming and an increase in owner-cultivating 
households from 349,000 in 1949 to 1,812,000 in 1950.72 
The instability and post-WWII challenges rendered reforms and radical changes 
indispensible in South Korea. While the tenants highly benefitted from the land 
reforms, the landlords were also compensated thereby creating a favourable 
setting for the enhancement of non-agricultural rural economic activities as well.  
Unlike North Korea, land was not redistributed without payments. Due to 
government intervention in expediting the payment of compensation to 
landlords whose land (beyond the threshold allowed to be owned) was 
distributed to tenants, the tenants made the payments at a prolonged period and a 
reasonable amount because the price of land was extremely low during the 
period.  
This was in contrast with the land reform in North Korea which led to 
economic stagnation. In South Korea, the land reform was accompanied by land 
tenure and land security. It broadened the mass base in land ownership whereas 
North Korea pursued the path of nationalization without compensation to the 
landlords, and allocated the land to communes whose members did not claim 
individual tenure and security. While the land reform applied in North Korea 
culminated in economic stagnation due to the communal system, the South 
Korean experience indicates the merits in empowering smallholder farmers 
through the creation of an enabling environment for land purchase and 
ownership and at the same time availing compensation to former land owners 
(other than the ones that were regarded as illicit large scale possessions such as 
Japanese colonialists). Moreover, the land reform eventually led to farmland 
consolidation and modern agriculture rather than farmland fragmentation, and it 
                                           
71 Ibid, [citing Jeon, Y.-D. and Y.-Y. Kim (2000). "Land Reform, Income 
Redistribution, and Agricultural Production in Korea." Economic Development and 
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marked a strong basis for the emergence and coalescence of modern industrial 
economy.  
South Korea’s experience in land rights clearly shows that the smallholder 
farmer was empowered with secure property rights and tenure because he/she 
does not merely hold the land but owns it. Nor did it entail the risk of mass 
eviction though manipulations from property speculators because owners were 
required to cultivate or manage the farm, in addition to which a ceiling was 
made to the area of individual ownership of land. As South Korea’s economy 
kicked-off and along with the maturity of its industrial economy the restrictions 
imposed during the initial stages of the land reform gradually gave way to 
farmland consolidation and modern agriculture with the optimal levels of tenure 
and security in land rights.  
2.2  Land reform in Taiwan and requisition for industrial use 
The land reform in Taiwan was conducted from 1949 to 1953. The reform 
involved rent reduction as the primary phase (1949), followed by the sale of 
public land in 1951 and the transfer of land to actual tillers (initiated in 1953)73  
through the compulsory purchase of farmland to resell it to tillers. As Koo 
observes: 
Taiwan underwent two distinct stages of agricultural development. The first 
phase from 1895 to 1945, while the island was under Japanese control, 
witnessed the introduction and extension of modern technology. There was 
large scale development of water resources and technological improvement 
in rice and sugar cane production under the promotion of the Japanese 
government. During the second phase-1945 to the present-the impetus to 
agricultural development was provided by the land reform program 
introduced after the end of the Second World War.74 
The Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) had failed to address the reform motto of 
land to the tiller in mainland China until it was ousted by the communists in 
1949.  After it left the mainland, its power was confined in the island which was 
part of China until the Chinese Communist Party overthrew the Kuomintang. 
The affiliation of the Kuomintang with the landed gentry in mainland China did 
not make such reform possible. However, the party which was an outsider to 
Taiwan and unattached to its landed gentry, did not dare to repeat its mistake 
regarding land reform. As Hsiao notes, the Nationalist Party undertook land 
                                           
73 Anthony Y. C. Koo (1966), “Economic Consequences of Land Reform in Taiwan”, 
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reform which “turned the rural sector from potential source of unrest into a 
fundamentally conservative social base”.75 
The first measure taken by the Nationalist government (Kuomintang) after it 
moved to Taiwan from the mainland was the reduction of rural land rent which 
fixed the maximum total yield to be given to the landlord at 37.5%. The reform 
also allowed temporary reduction of the sharecropping as land rent during crop 
failure.   
The second phase of the land reform involved the transfer of land to the 
actual tillers when the government started to sell state-owned land to tenants. 
This reform was preceded by peasant movements in 1947 and 1948 against 
state-owned Taiwanese Sugar Company.76 “More than fifty per cent of the 
farmland owned by the central and provincial government” was transferred and 
‘cultivators of public land, and other tenant farmers, were given first and second 
priority respectively for the purchase of public land” at a price “set at 2.5 times 
the annual yield of the annual crops … to be paid in twenty instalments over a 
period of ten years”.77  
The third phase of the land reform took place upon the enactment of the 1953 
Land-to-the-Tiller Act78 and the Regulations Governing the Implementation of 
the Act.79 “There were 26 grades for paddy land and 26 grades for dry land.”80 
The Act “limited land holdings to roughly three cha (about 2.9 hectares) of 
medium quality (7th to 12th grade) of paddy land or its equivalent.”81 All land in 
excess of this size was compulsorily purchased by the government for 
redistribution. 
The landlords were compensated with a price of 2.5 of the annual yield of the 
land. They “were paid 70 per cent of the purchase bond in Commodity Bonds, 
i.e. ten-year bearer government bonds, redeemable in either rice or sweet potato, 
                                           
75 Michael H. H. Hsiao (1988), “State and Small Farmers in East Asia with Special 
Reference to Taiwan”, paper presented at Conference on Directions and Strategies of 
Agricultural Development in Asia-Pacific Region, Academia Sinica, Taipei, January 
5-7, 1988 [in Ming Yu-Hom, infra note 47, p. 90.] 
76 Shih-jung Hsu and Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao (2001), “Taiwan’s Land Reform 
Revisited: From the Vantage Point of Its Domestic Social Origins”, Taiwan Historical 
Research, Vol. 8 No. 1, p. 123, June 2001, Issued October 2001. Institute of Taiwan 
History, Preparatory Office, Acadamia Sinica. 
77 Ming Yu-Ho (1997), “Law, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Development 
in Taiwan”, PhD Thesis, (University of Warwick School of Law, August 1997), p. 91. 
78 Enacted on January 20, 1953. 
79 Enacted on April 23, 1953. 
80 Ming Yu-Ho, supra note 77 (1997), p. 91. [citing Samuel P. S. Ho (1978) Economic 
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depending on whether the land was paddy-field or dry”.82 Moreover, these 
Bonds “paid a 4 per cent annual interest” and the remaining balance of 30 
(thirty) per cent of the purchase price “was paid in shares of stock in four 
government enterprises shortly transferred to the private sector”.83 Such 
payment in stock shares in public enterprises “had the effect of converting 
investments in land into industrial assets and laying the foundation for the 
industrialization of Taiwan”.84 
During the period between May to December 1953, the land was sold to “its 
former tenant farmers at the same price it had been purchased” and the buyers 
received government loans to be paid “in ten annual instalments and a 4 per cent 
annual interest rate in rice (for paddy land) and in sweet potatoes, converted to 
cash (for dry land)”.85 
Ming Yu-Ho states three outcomes of the reform.86 Agricultural production 
rose 43% from 1952 to 1960, and rice yield per hectare increased by 25% during 
the same period. Secondly, the reform and the compensation schemes directed 
former landlords to urban businesses thereby enhancing domestic investment. 
And the third impact of the reform was the industrialization that benefited from 
the conducive environment created by agricultural surplus and the enhanced 
entrepreneurship of former landowners whose interest changed from agriculture 
to businesses and ultimately to industrialization. “Under conditions prevailing in 
Taiwan, the improvement in the efficiency of agricultural production was a 
logical first step toward industrialization”.87 There were also other concurrent 
factors that facilitated industrialization. As Thuemmel notes, education 
institutions, “island-wide network of farmers associations” (that existed since 
1944), and the fact that over a million educated and well-trained mainland 
Chinese fled to Taiwan have contributed  to Taiwan’s economic performance in 
addition to the land reform.88  
                                           
82 Ibid [citing Simon  Long (1991) Taiwan: China's Last Frontier, London: MacMillan, 
p. 78]. 
83 Id., p. 92 [citing, Ralph N. Clough (1978) Island China, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, p. 73]. 
84  Thomas R. Bowden  (1961), “Land Reform and Rural Development on Taiwan”, 
University College Review, Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring, 
1961), p. 34.  
85 Ming Yu-Ho, supra note 77, p. 92 [citing Ralph N. Clough (1978) Island China, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, p. 73 & Simon  Long (1991) Taiwan: 
China's Last Frontier, London: MacMillan, pp. 162-63] 
86 Id., p. 93. 
87 Anthony Y. C. Koo (1966), “Economic Consequences of Land Reform in Taiwan”, 
Asian Survey, Vol. 6, No. 3 (University of California Press , Mar., 1966), p. 157 
88 William L. Thuemmel (1969), Book Review “The Role of Land Reform in Economic 
Development: A Case Study of Taiwan” by Anthony Y.C. Koo; The Journal of 
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Various factors have contributed for the success of the land reform in 
Taiwan. These factors include the land survey carried out during the period of 
Japan’s control and the compensation paid to landlords and the effective control 
of inflation against decrease in the value of compensation. Moreover, the 
National government was an outsider which had autonomy from the Taiwanese 
landed gentry. This enabled it to have utmost flexibility in decisions because the 
National government did not depend on the support of the landed gentry.  
Sun Yat-Sen’s principles have consistently influenced the National 
government’s land use laws. One of Sun’s core principles “is the Principle of 
People's Livelihood” whose realization envisaged the ‘equalization of land 
rights’ and the ‘regulation of capital’ with a view to securing “an even, 
nationalized distribution of the benefits of land as a natural resource, while 
preserving private ownership of land”.89   
Articles 142 and 143(1) of the 1947 Constitution of Taiwan (with 
amendments through 1987) provide the following: 
Article 142 
The national economy shall be based on the principle of people’s livelihood 
and shall seek to bring about an equal distribution of land rights and regulate 
the use of private capital in order to ensure an equitable distribution of 
national income and a sufficient livelihood for the people. 
Article 143 
1. All land within the territorial limits of [Taiwan] shall belong to the entire 
body of citizens. Private ownership of land, acquired by the people in 
accordance with the law, shall be protected and limited by law. Privately 
owned land shall be liable to taxation according to its value and may be 
purchased by the Government according to its value. 
As Bishai observes “[t]his constitutional framework is based on Sun's notion of 
the state as mediator between the primary public ownership and the individual 
private owner”.90 After the land reform was implemented based on the principle 
of people’s livelihood, there was the need to facilitate Taiwan’s transition to 
industrialization. In effect, a Statute for Encouragement of Investment was 
promulgated on 10 September 1960 and subsequently had series of 
amendments. This law articulated the manner in which land was transferred to 
industries to enhance industrial economy.  
                                                                                                            
Developing Areas, Vol. 3, No. 4 (College of Business, Tennessee State University , 
Jul., 1969), pp. 590-591. 
89  Martha Fitzpatrick Bishai (1991), “The Development of Industrial Land in Taiwan: 
A Legal Framework for State Control” , The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 26, 
No. 1 (College of Business, Tennessee State University, Oct., 1991), p. 54. 
90 Id., p. 56. 
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Chapter III of the Statute is titled “Acquisition of Land for Industrial Use," 
and Article 50 provided that “… the Executive Yuan shall first allocate public 
land areas to be designated as industrial land for industrial development 
purposes.” It further stipulated that in the event that public land is insufficient 
for such allocation, “private land may be converted for use and designated as 
industrial land.” After such designation, the land will be frozen. This measure 
includes prohibition of construction and transfer after which detailed plan of 
requisition is drawn. Thereafter “[t]he land administration sets a date on which 
the owners of the designated land are to negotiate and to ‘agree upon the price 
of compensation for the land.’ If agreement is not reached, the government 
(through its Committee for Assessment of Standard Land Value) assesses a 
price.”  
The Statute ensured that holdouts by land owners through exaggerated price 
offers shall not hamper the requisition, and at the same time recognized payment 
of the market price to the land.  According to Article 56 of the Statute the land 
requisitioned in accordance with the Statute “shall be compensated for the 
market price through negotiation and agreement. The market price … means the 
prevailing price, in general transaction, of the land in the locality, used for the 
same purpose as the requisitioned land is used prior to its requisition”.  This 
provision allowed the state to set land prices where negotiation fails. “Most 
often, however, the state would actually purchase the land, develop it for 
industrial use, and then sell or lease it to the industrial user”91 in order to 
“prevent the disastrous effects of land speculation”.92 
3. China’s Land Rights Regime: An Overview  
3.1 Options and challenges in land rights 
The economic reforms in China since 1979 are reflected in its legal regimes and 
economic policies including property rights.93 These reforms are gradual and 
cautious even if market forces are steadily allowed to have impact in the 
economy. China still considers its economy as ‘socialist’ but with ‘Chinese 
characteristics’.  
The three options that were deliberated upon in post-1979 China with regard 
to land rights were privatization, state ownership in lieu of the rights vested on 
the communes, and choosing among the variations of collective ownership 
managed by the villages themselves (i.e. natural villages) or by administrative 
                                           
91 Id., p. 58. 
92 Id., p. 61. 
93 See Land Administration Law (promulgated on June 25, 1986, revised Dec. 29, 1988, 
Aug. 29, 1998, and Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004); and Law on Land 
Contract in Rural Areas (promulgated., Aug. 29, 2002, effective March 1 2003). 
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villages.94  China has opted “to avoid widespread social conflict over land” and 
“the central government decided – with good reason – to leave collective land 
ownership undefined” along with a similar approach in the definition of the 
‘state-owned land’ because “it was unclear which administrative level 
represented ownership”.95 In spite of these gaps in specificity, China de-
collectivized the post-1949 village communes and introduced Household 
Contract Responsibility Systems for agricultural land (or cropland) in such a 
manner that productivity and incentives could be encouraged without a hasty 
reversal of the collective ownership regime. Accordingly, households entered 
into lease contracts with the collective which owns the land and to which they 
are members.  
These gaps in the definition of collective land ownership had various 
downsides including administrative abuse from executive office holders:  
  As it is unclear which level of the collective is legally entitled to represent 
land ownership, corrupt local cadres have a powerful incentive to sell land 
that is not theirs. The clearest example of such dark practices was the 
dishonourable discharge in October 2003 of Tian Fengshan, Minister of 
Land Resources. Tian was charged with corruption and land theft during his 
term as governor of Heilongjiang Province from 1995 to 1999…. Over the 
years, many farmers have been faced with forced eviction from their land as 
entire villages have been [allocated] for real estate development. It was 
estimated that over the period 1985–96 the total loss in arable land due to 
construction activities amounted to 1.3 million ha. … Since China has only 
one third of the world country average of arable land, these losses also 
threaten China’s food security.96 
Even if the village collective continued to retain the bare ownership of rural land 
in China, the administrative village leased out land to individual households 
(under the Household Contract Responsibility System) which led to 
fragmentation and challenges to environmental planning and protection.  
 
 
                                           
94 Peter Ho (2005), Institutions in Transition: Land Ownership, Property Rights and 
Social Conflict in China (Oxford University Press). “In 1998 there were 739,980 
administrative villages as against almost 1.5 million natural villages”. (p. 193). 
95 Id., p. 188. 
96 Id., p. 190 [citing Garrie van Pinxteren, ‘Chinese Minister Ontslagen’ (‘Chinese 
Minister Sacked’), NCR Handelsblad (23 October 2003), p. 4.; and  Ministry of 
Agriculture, China Agricultural Development Report (Beijing: Nongye Chubanshe, 
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3.2  Compensation for expropriation of rural land under China’s 
Land Administration Law 
China’s Land Administration Law (LAL) was enacted in 1988, and there have 
been two amendments in 1988 and 2004.  It maintains socialist public ownership 
of land97 which is defined as “ownership by the whole people and collective 
ownership by the working people”.98 The law classifies land into “land for 
agriculture, land for construction and unused land” and pledges to “keep the 
total area of land for construction under control”.99 The procedures of 
expropriation and the compensation paid upon expropriation are criticized in 
various literature. Yet, there are positive developments of steady reform.  
According to Article 47 of China’s Land Administrative Law, the 
compensation upon the expropriation of rural land includes (a) compensation for 
the land, (b) resettlement subsidies and (c) compensation for attachments and 
young crops on the requisitioned land.   
“Compensation for expropriated of cultivated land shall be six to ten times 
the average annual output value of the expropriated land, calculated on the 
basis of three years preceding such requisition. … The standard resettlement 
subsidies to be divided among members of the agricultural population 
needing resettlement shall be four to six times the average annual output 
value of the expropriated cultivated land calculated on the basis of three 
years preceding such expropriation. However, the maximum resettlement 
subsidies for each hectare of the expropriated cultivated land shall not exceed 
fifteen times its average annual output value calculated on the basis of three 
years preceding such expropriation”.100 …  
In case the land compensation and resettlement subsidies stated above “are still 
insufficient to enable the peasants needing resettlement to maintain their original 
living standards, the resettlement subsidies may be increased” without, however, 
exceeding “30 times the average annual output value of the expropriated land 
calculated on the basis of three years preceding such expropriation”.101 
3.3 China’s 2007 Property Rights Law 
After long deliberations and rehearsals in various policy options, China has in 
2007 enacted its property rights law. The amendment of Article 10 of the 
Chinese Constitution in 1988102 was a fundamental step toward the enhancement 
                                           
97 Land Administrative Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 1. 
98 Id., Art. 2. 
99 Id., Art. 4. 
100 Id., Art. 47. 
101 Ibid. 
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of the scope of land use rights in China. The fourth paragraph of Article 10 of 
the Constitution, which provided that “no organization or individual may 
appropriate, buy, sell or lease land or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by 
unlawful means,” was amended as: “No organization or individual may 
appropriate, buy, sell or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful 
means. The right to the use of land may be transferred according to law.” This 
constitutional framework which allowed the transfer of the right to the use of 
land became conducive to legal reform in China’s property rights regime. 
The 2007 Property Rights Law of China recognizes three forms of 
ownership: state, collective and individual. It also embodies provisions on 
usufruct rights (Articles 117-123). The general stipulations on ownership 
(Articles 39 to 42), inter alia, include: 
- “the right to possess, utilize, dispose of and obtain profits from its real or 
movable property in accordance with the laws” (Art. 39) ; 
- “the right to establish usufruct and security right in property rights with 
regard to its real or movable property”(Art 40); and  
- the obligee’s duty not to do harm  to the rights and interests of the usufruct 
and security right holders while the latter exercise their  rights (Art. 40). 
Article 42 of China’s Property Rights Law allows, ‘for the purpose of public 
interest’, the expropriation of “collectively-owned land, houses and other real 
property owned by institutes or individuals” in accordance with the law. 
According to the same provision, the compensation for collectively-owned land 
includes “compensations for the land expropriated, subsidies for resettlement, 
compensations for the fixtures and the young crops on land”, and it further 
provides that “the premiums for social security of the farmers whose land is 
expropriated shall be allocated in full, in order to guarantee their normal lives 
and safeguard their lawful rights and interests”. 
Paragraph 3, Article 10 of the Chinese Constitution (as amended by Article 
20 of Amendment 4 to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China – 
2004) reads “The state may, for the public interest, expropriate or take over land 
for public use, and pay compensation in accordance with the law.” This 
stipulation replaces the former version which provided that “[t]he state may, for 
the public interest, take over land for its use in accordance with the law.” The 
word ‘for its use’ now reads ‘public use’, and the payment of compensation is 
also included.  
Property that belongs to the whole state means ownership by the whole 
people and “[t]he State Council shall, on behalf of the State, exercise the 
ownership” (Art. 45). Such property includes mineral resources, waters, sea 
areas (Art. 46).  Urban land is also owned by the state (Art. 47) subject to the 
exception that “the right to the use of residential housing land shall enjoy the 
right to possess and utilize such land as collectively owned” (Art. 152). “All 
natural resources such as forests, mountains, grassland, unclaimed land and 
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beaches are owned by the State, with the exception of the resources that are 
collectively-owned in accordance with the law” (Article 48). There are also 
other resources that may be owned by the state in accordance with the law. 
These include outskirts of urban areas, wild animals, cultural relics, public 
facilities such as railways, roads, electric power, communications, gas pipes etc 
(Arts 46, 49, 51, 52).  
Rural land is collectively owned and this includes all resources not owned by 
the state (Art. 58).  There can also be collectively owned urban property (Art. 
59).  Under these regimes, land can be transferred to individuals or legal persons 
through contract arrangements. Articles 124 to 134 deal with farmland use 
rights. These rights can extend to thirty years, or up to fifty years for grassland, 
and up to seventy years for forests (Art. 126). There are recent policies 
(highlighted below under Section 3.4) that seek to extend such timeframes into 
indefinite time.  
The person who has the land use right is “entitled to circulate such right by 
adopting such means as subcontract, exchange and assignment in accordance 
with the provision of the Rural Land Contract Law” subject to the condition that 
the “circulated term may not exceed the remaining period of the contract term.” 
(Art. 128). Within the framework of state ownership of urban land, a person 
who holds use right over a plot of land is referred to as “the owner of the right to 
the use of land for construction”.  This shows that the holder of urban land in 
China owns not only the fixtures on the land but is also unequivocally 
considered as the owner of the right to use the land.  The following provisions 
are cases in point:  
- “The owner of the right to the use of land for construction use shall, 
according to law, be entitled to possess, utilize and obtain profits from the 
State-owned land, and have the right, by utilizing such land, to build 
buildings and their accessory facilities”. (Article 135) 
- “The ownership of the building, structure and their accessory facilities built 
by the owner of the right to the use of land for construction use shall belong 
to such owner, unless there is evidence to the contrary sufficient to 
invalidate that”. (Article 142) 
- “Except as otherwise provided for by law, the owner of the right to the use 
of land for construction use shall have the right to transfer, exchange, make 
as capital contribution, donate or mortgage the right to the use of land for 
construction use”. (Article 143) 
- “Where the owners of the right to the use of land for construction use 
transfer, exchange, make as capital contribution, donate to others or 
mortgage the right to the use of land for construction use, the parties 
concerned shall enter into corresponding contract in writing. The term of 
such contract to be determined by parties concerned shall not exceed the 
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remaining duration of the right to the use of land for construction use”. 
(Article 144) 
Although urban land is in principle state-owned, “[t]he owner of the right to the 
use of residential housing land shall”, as stated above “enjoy the right to possess 
and utilize such land as collectively owned, and the right to build residential 
house and its accessory facilities on such land”. (Article 152). In other words, 
the scope of the use rights in urban land that is used for residential purposes may 
be comparable to the one held in rural areas as farmland.  
In the property rights discourse, utmost focus is not given to “who ‘owns’ 
land”, but rather to “the formal and informal provisions that determine who has 
a right to enjoy benefit streams that emerge from the use of assets and who has 
no such rights”.103 Even if the ownership of land in China is vested in the state 
or the collective, the 2007 Property Rights Law clearly defines the nature and 
scope of use rights. Not only are the rules regarding the elements of use rights 
defined, the enforcement mechanism is also stipulated.   
3.4 Current pursuits of further reform in rural land rights 
Since 1978/79, China is steadily moving along the path of various reforms 
including property rights. It has “moved from a communal system of farming to 
a system that grants more extensive land-use rights to individual households” 
enabling rural China to march toward greater prosperity.104 Farmers are given 
thirty-year contractual rights under the Land Administration Law “and the Law 
on Rural Land Contracting strengthens this right by more specifically 
enumerating requirements for land contracting and the transfer of contractual 
rights”.105 With a view to further rural reform “the government has issued two 
policy directives that outline measures to increase land tenure security with the 
goals of doubling farmers’ incomes by 2020 and maintaining the country’s grain 
supply”.106  
Such reforms in rural China can indeed increase “the prosperity of the 
countryside” which, inter alia, “would benefit the Chinese economy as a whole 
                                           
103 Shimelles Tenaw, K.M. Zahidul Islam & Tuulikki Parviainen (2009), “Effects of 
Land Tenure and Property Rights on Agricultural Productivity in Ethiopia, Namibia 
and Bangladesh”, University of Helsinki, Department of Economics and 
Management, Discussion Papers n:o 33, Helsinki 2009, p. 8 [citing (Bromley 1991, 
Eggertsson 1990, Libecap 1989)]. 
104 Robin Dean and Tobias Damm-Luhr (2010), “A Current Review of Chinese Land-
use Law and Policy: A “Breakthrough” in Rural Development”,  Pacific Rim Law & 
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by increasing domestic demand”.107 Policy documents issued after the 2007 
Property Rights Law (known as the 2008 Decision and the 2009 No. 1 
Document of the Chinese Communist Party) “promote three major changes to 
rural land-use law”.108 Primarily, “the Policy Documents indicate that the 
contractual land-use terms will expand from thirty to an indefinite number of 
years”.109 Moreover, these reforms can “spur the growth of rural land-use rights 
markets” and reinforce the commitment to maintain the agricultural use of 
farmland by reducing the conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural 
uses.110  
3.5 China’s Administrative Laws  
Various laws have been enacted in China toward due process in administrative 
procedures, transparency, accountability, judicial review and the redress 
available in the event of abuse of authority. The purpose of China’s 
Administrative Procedure Law111 enacted 1989, include “protecting the lawful 
rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and other organizations, and 
safeguarding and supervising the exercise of administrative powers by 
administrative organs in accordance with the law”.112 According to Article 2 of 
the Administrative Procedure Law (APL), any “citizen, a legal person or any 
other organization” is entitled to bring a suit to court if he/she/it “considers that 
his/her or its lawful rights and interests have been infringed upon by a specific 
administrative act of an administrative organ or its personnel”. The court shall 
thereupon “exercise judicial power independently with respect to administrative 
cases, and shall not be subject to interference by any administrative organ, 
public organization or individual”, and to this end, the courts “shall set up 
administrative divisions for the handling of administrative cases”.113 These 
benches are required to “base themselves on facts and take the law as a 
criterion” and “examine the legality of specific administrative acts”.114 
Subject to the exceptions stated under Article 12 of the Administrative 
Procedure Law, courts are required to “accept suits brought by citizens, legal 
persons or other organizations against any of the specific administrative acts 
                                           
107 Id., p. 123 [citing Fei-Ling Wang, (stating that “raising the purchasing power of the 
rural Chinese majority would probably provide the Chinese economy with a great 
push in the years ahead”)]. 
108 Id., p. 138. 
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid. 
111 Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, (enacted in 4 
April 1989, and in force on 1 October 1990). 
112 Id., Article 1. 
113 Id.. Article 3. 
114 Id., Articles 4 and 5. 
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embodied in Article 1 which include confiscation of property, freezing of 
property, infringement of rights of the person or property, and other rights.115 
Series of laws have also been promulgated that incorporate elements of 
administrative law, such as the Legislative Law (2000), Administrative 
Supervision Law (1997), Administrative Punishment Law (1996), State Liability 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (1994) and others. The lessons that can 
be drawn in this regard relate to the specificity of the functions of administrative 
authorities, the procedures of redress and judicial review. There is, however, 
criticism regarding the level of the implementation of these laws.  
As Liu Jianlong observes, “the effectiveness of the law in controlling public 
powers” is modest in China and he attributes this problem to three factors: the 
vulnerability of courts to interference from administrative organs, “the 
mechanical dogmatic approach adopted by most judges”, and the need to update 
some of the provisions of the 1989 Administrative Procedure Law. 116  Jianlong 
states that the 1982 Constitution “and the three procedural laws have clearly 
specified that the courts exercise their trial powers independent of any 
interference from administrative organs, social organizations and 
                                           
115 Id., Article 1. The rights protected are the following: 
(1) an administrative sanction, such as detention, fine, rescission of a license or 
permit, order to suspend production or business or confiscation of property, 
which one refuses to accept; 
(2) a compulsory administrative measure, such as restricting freedom of the 
person or the sealing up, seizing or freezing of property, which one refuses 
to accept; 
(3)  infringement upon one's managerial decision-making powers, which is 
considered to have been perpetrated by an administrative organ; 
(4) refusal by an administrative organ to issue a permit or license, which one 
considers oneself legally qualified to apply for, or its failure to respond to 
the application; 
(5) refusal by an administrative organ to perform its statutory duty of 
protecting one's rights of the person and of property, as one has applied for, 
or its failure to respond to the application; 
(6) cases where an administrative organ is considered to have failed to issue a 
pension according to law; 
(7) cases where an administrative organ is considered to have illegally 
demanded the performance of duties; and  
(8) cases where an administrative organ is considered to have infringed upon 
other rights of the person and of property. 
Apart from the provisions set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the people's 
courts shall accept other administrative suits which may be brought in 
accordance with the provisions of relevant laws and regulations. 
116 Liu Jianlong (2011), ‘Administrative Litigation in China: Parties and Their Rights 
and Obligations’, NUJS Law Review, Volume 4, April-June 2011, p. 229. 
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individuals”.117 He thus underlines the need to guarantee the financial and 
personal independence of the courts and the judges and improve the education 
level of judges.118  
4. Land Rights in Singapore and Entrepreneur Perceptions  
4.1 Land rights in Singapore  
The ideology of People’s Action Party (PAP) as of the early 1960s included 
social engineering, economic growth, modesty in lifestyle, Asian Values, and 
meritocracy.119 As an island city state, Singapore devised a land law regime that 
could enable the state to have a wide policy space in the construction of 
residential, office and commercial premises. Its housing project targeted at its 
whole population. Over 80 percent of the population now lives in self-owned 
apartments. “The government also allows citizens to borrow from the 
centralized pension system for home purchase, another incentive that has helped 
push the percentage of owner-occupiers to such high levels”.120 
The legal framework on Singapore’s real property traces its roots to English 
common law. All land in Singapore belongs to the state, and there is a 
distinction in land titles, namely freehold and leasehold estates. The power of 
the state in freehold estate is limited to the exercise of “police powers and the 
right of eminent domain”.121 “Freehold estates form a small minority of private 
land holdings in Singapore and are no longer granted by the government” while 
“[l]easehold is the primary form of land ownership in the country. Leasehold 
estates are granted by the government, typically for 99-year terms. The 1992 
State Lands Act made the 99-year term the standard except for rare 
exceptions.122 
The general categories of the freehold and lease estates include various 
specific types of titles within the framework of the principle that land belongs to 
the state and may be granted to individuals or legal persons. “The grantees do 
                                           
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 David E. Anderson (2002), “Land Rights and Economic Opportunities, an 
exploratory comparison of Singapore and Taiwan” [in Douglas, I., Huang, S. L. 
(Editors) Urbanization, East Asia and Habitat II, Taipei, TW: CIER Press, p. 171] 
120 Belina Yuen (2007), “Squatters No More: Singapore Social Housing”, Global Urban 
Development Magazene, Vol. 3. Issue 1, November 2007, Available at 
<http://www.globalurban.org/GUDMag07Vol3Iss1/Yuen.htm>, Accessed 04 August 
2013. 
121 National Association of Realtors  
<http://www.realtor.org/intlprof.nsf/all/singapore?OpenDocument&Print=Yes> , 
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not really own the physical land itself but periods of time over the land during 
which they can exercise their rights of ownership. These time periods are called 
‘estates’.”123 Singapore’s land law recognizes four kinds of estate in land, 
namely “the freehold fee simple estate, the freehold life estate, the estate in 
perpetuity created by the State Lands Act, and the leasehold estate”.124  
  Even though all land belongs to the State, it does not mean that there is no 
private property in Singapore. The individuals or the institutions that are 
granted estates of land by the State are true ‘owners’ and are entitled to 
certain rights over the land. The commonly accepted rights associated with 
the ownership of an estate in land are the rights to possess and to exclude all 
others from accessing the land, the right to use and enjoy it in the manner 
the owner likes subject to the existing rules, and the right to alienate it. 125 
Distinction is made between “two categories of land in Singapore: private land, 
enjoyed by the individuals and corporations that are granted estates in land by 
the State, and State land”.126  A person who owns the freehold fee simple estate 
“owns the property indefinitely, without the need to pay any rent, and upon his 
death, the property passes onto his successors. The second freehold estate is the 
life estate, which is much rarer, and confers ownership for the duration of the 
person’s lifetime”.127  Leasehold estates, as stated above are usually granted for 
99 year leases. “An estate in perpetuity is an interest in land, created by a grant 
of land to an individual by the State in perpetuity, subject to terms and 
conditions agreed upon by the two parties. Such an interest may also be 
governed by the State Lands Act”.128  
4.2 Entrepreneur perceptions about Singapore’s institutions  
Singapore is well known for its rate of development, low unemployment rates, 
nearly corruption-free government, its attraction to Foreign Direct Investment 
and foreign workforce. It is “a small island city-state with a total land area of 
640 square kilometers” and has gone through challenges when it obtained its 
internal self-government (1959), “joined the then newly formed Federation of 
Malaysia in 1963” from which it withdrew and became an independent republic 
                                           
123 Soicher Mihaela Ecaterina (2004), The Applicability in Singapore of the Principle of 
Reasonable Access to Land Open for Public Use (LL.M Thesis, University of 
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in 1965.129  There were various problems encountered by the government of 
Singapore upon independence which include rapid population growth, housing 
shortages and unemployment.130 These problems are events of the past, because 
“Singapore has become a model for economic development” and there is 
virtually no unemployment in the country. 131  “The national savings rate is 51 
percent while the home ownership rate is 92 percent”.132 
Surveys were conducted about the institutional settings which included 
private property rights in Hong Kong and Singapore before Hong Kong was 
united to China. “The surveys of Hong Kong and Singapore were part of an 
attempt to gain a world-wide private sector assessment of institutional quality... 
in June 1997, i.e., just before the handover of Hong Kong to China”.133  The 
themes of the survey (on entrepreneur perceptions) were predictability of rule 
making, perception of political instability, security of persons and property, 
predictability of law enforcement and corruption, and expectations of future 
developments in these areas of private sector concerns.134 
                                           
129 Sock-Yong Phang (1996), “Economic Development and the Distribution of Land 
Rents in Singapore: A Georgist Implementation”, American Journal of Economics 




133 Beatrice Weder and Aymo Brunetti (2000), “Another Tale of Two Cities: A Note on 
Institutions in Hong Kong and Singapore”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für diegesamte Staatswissenschaft, Vol. 156, No. 2 
(June 2000), p. 317. 
134 “Predictability of rule making: ... [1] the extent to which entrepreneurs have to cope 
with unexpected changes in rules and policies;  [2] whether they expect their 
governments to adhere to announced policies; ... [3] the degree to which 
entrepreneurs are informed about important changes in rules; [4. Whether they] can 
voice concerns when planned changes affect their business; [5. whether] ... 
entrepreneurs have to cope with unpredictable retrospective changes in laws and 
regulations. 
           Perception of political instability: ... whether government changes (constitutional 
and unconstitutional) are perceived to be accompanied by far-reaching policy 
surprises which could have serious effects on the private sec-tor.  
          Security of persons and property: ... [1] whether entrepreneurs feel confident that 
the authorities would protect them and their property from criminal actions, and [2] 
whether theft and crime represent serious problems for business operations. 
          Predictability of law enforcement and corruption: ... [1] the uncertainty arising 
from arbitrary enforcement of rules by the judiciary and whether such 
unpredictability presents a problem for doing business. [2] whether it is common for 
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The results of the survey showed that “entrepreneurs in both Singapore and 
Hong Kong gave top marks to the institutional infrastructure” with ratings “very 
similar for both city-states and in most cases they were clearly higher than for 
all other countries surveyed”.135 Hong Kong’s score regarding perception of 
changes in government was significantly higher than Singapore’s owing to “the 
fairly centralized political system of Singapore”136 which caused higher 
perception in change of laws. However, this perception about Singapore was not 
related to entrepreneurs’ perception of “unconstitutional government changes 
accompanied by far-reaching policy surprises”.137 
The rating for Singapore with regard to predictability of rule making was 
“more favorable than for an average of OECD countries” as “about 90% of 
responding entrepreneurs in both Hong Kong and Singapore said that in general 
they expected government to stick to announced policies”.138 The number of 
entrepreneurs who “feared retrospective changes in regulation which could be 
important for their business” was very few, while “by comparison, in Africa this 
fear was expressed by over 50% of entrepreneurs”. 139  
Entrepreneurs in both Hong Kong and Singapore agreed that “property rights 
security is not a problem” and “they felt completely confident that the state 
authorities would protect their person and property from criminal actions and 
that theft and crime were absolutely no problem for their business”.140 With 
regard to the reliability of the judiciary “over 80% of entrepreneurs responded 
positively, compared with only 60% in the average of the OECD, and only 20% 
in the average of less developed countries”.141 All entrepreneurs responded very 
positively regarding the absence of corruption. “Overall, the private sector 
surveys suggest that the quality of institutions in Hong Kong and Singapore was 
extraordinarily benign”.142 
Conclusion 
Comparative experience of other countries can inform Ethiopia’s pursuits of 
addressing the challenges in the legislative, administrative and judicial 
                                                                                                            
          The final question ... asks entrepreneurs about their expectations of future 
developments in the four main areas discussed above.” Weder and Brunetti, Ibid. P. 
318. 
135 Id., p. 319. 
136 Id., p. 321. 
137 Id., p. 321. 
138 Id.. p. 319. 
139 Id., p. Ibid. 
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protection of property rights. The denial of economic value to land use rights in 
any country that pledges to pursue developmental state economic policies is 
incompatible with the land policies and laws pursued by the developmental 
states of the 1960s such as South Korea and Taiwan which offer good examples 
regarding the role of the state at the initial phases of industrial kick-off.  
Moreover, the experience of Singapore that has a legal regime based on state 
ownership of land shows that security and tenure in land use rights can be put in 
place even under state ownership. A Legal regime that restricts the scope of land 
use rights can also take lessons from the steady reforms that are underway to 
widen the scope of China’s land use rights regime even if China still espouses 
socialism blended with market-led economic policies. 
There are lessons that can be drawn from the legal regimes of these countries  
in relation with the various proclamations in Ethiopia’s property rights regime 
that deal with the scope, tenure and security of urban and rural land use rights. 
One of the major avenues that benefit from the experience of developmental 
states is expropriation. Although there can be various definitions of 
expropriation, they share common characteristics in that the “expropriation 
should be for ‘public use’, carried out on behalf of the public”, and it should 
involve just compensation143  which should not be confined to the value of the 
fixtures and houses on the land. Generally, “compensation should be for loss of 
any land, buildings, other improvements” or for their reduction of value “as a 
result of the acquisition, and for any disturbances and other losses to the 
livelihoods of the owners or occupants caused by the acquisition and 
dispossession (FAO 2008)”.144   
As the purpose of this article is to highlight some country experience in the 
legal regimes of four countries, the definition of public purpose, expropriation 
and compensation under Ethiopian law is beyond the scope of our discussion. 
What can be said in the context of this article is that the economic value to land 
use rights, definition of ‘public purpose’ and the amount of compensation upon 
expropriation need careful consideration.  First, the extent to which the 
definition of ‘public purpose’145 is wider than the one that was used in the 
                                           
143 Yin Lei (2010), Developing Online Participatory Model (OPM) for Land 
Expropriation in China (MSc Thesis, International Institute for Geo-Information 
Science and Earth Observation, Enshede, the Netherlands), p. 2. 
144 Id., p. 18. 
145 According to Article 2(5) of the Expropriation of Land Holdings for Public Purposes 
and Payment of Compensation Proclamation No. 455/2005, ‘public purpose’ “means 
the use of land defined as such by the decision of the appropriate body in conformity 
with urban structure plan or development plan in order to ensure the interest of the 
peoples to acquire direct or indirect benefits from the use of the land and to 




240                                          MIZAN LAW REVIEW                             Vol. 7 No.2, December 2013 
 
developmental state policies of the countries considered in this article, and 
secondly, the issue whether economic value to land use rights is denied in 
Ethiopia thereby lowering the amount of compensation (upon land 
expropriation) can be informed by the lessons that can be drawn from the 
country experience discussed in the preceding sections.  
As the experience of South Korea and Taiwan indicates, developmental 
states have features and policies which enhance economic development, and it is 
these factors that determine the classification of a state into one of the stations 
between predatory and developmental statehood. The land laws of 
developmental states clearly pursue the principle of equitable redistribution 
without denying private rights on land. China pursues socialism with ‘Chinese 
characteristics’ and yet it clearly recognizes the urban landholder as “the owner 
of the right to the use of land for construction”.  The fact that China is in the 
course of further reforms toward indefinite terms in use rights and other issues 
including compensation will further enhance the tenure and security of property 
rights.   
And finally, the lessons from Singapore’s land regime indicate that 
individuals and companies can own estates, i.e. the years during which one can 
have use rights even if the state has bare ownership. The duration of the estates 
according to Singapore’s land law may be for an indefinite duration, 99 years, or 
lesser number of years based on the category of the estates to which a person is 
entitled to. The lessons that can be drawn from Singapore also relate to the level 
of institutional competence and integrity.  
The land reform of developmental states (such as South Korea and Taiwan in 
the 1950s and 1960s) has indeed enhanced agricultural productivity and saving 
which ultimately facilitated industrialization. Moreover, the land laws in 
Singapore and the steady land use right reforms in China prove that private 
ownership of land use rights can co-exist with public ownership of land. The 
comparative experience discussed in this article thus shows that private 
ownership of land use rights and public ownership of land are not exclusive 
(either/or) opposites but aspects of land rights that can co-exist in harmony 
within a holistic spectrum of property rights.                                                       ■ 
                                                 
